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Abstract  
We examine the heterogeneous effects due to government stability of foreign aid on tax 
revenues in the West African Economic and Monetary Union countries over the period 1986-
2010. We show that the tax effects of aid are gradual and varying across countries according 
to the level of government stability. The Panel Smooth Threshold Regressions indicate that at 
low levels of government stability, aid negatively affects tax performances. At high levels, it 
encourages tax collection. Consequently, we provide estimates of individual time varying 
coefficients of aid effects. In general, the positive effects are marked since the mid of 1990 
decade. However, decomposing aid into its forms of loans, technical and non-technical grants 
provides nuanced results. 
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1 Introduction
An adequate supply of public goods and services is essential for economic growth and
poverty reduction in developing countries. Yet the funding of this supply remains a
major challenge due to a low level of public resources. In order to make up this gap,
developing countries resort to international assistance mainly in the form of foreign aid.
However, empirical research on the eect of aid on tax performances is very inconclusive.
Indeed, in one hand some authors argue that foreign aid can substitute for tax revenues
by deterring the incentives to reforms and good policies (Azam et al., 1999; Benedek
et al., 2012). On the contrary, some others authors found that aid doesn't harm tax
performance in recipient countries in the extent that the latter benet from technical
assistance (Brun et al., 2011b), and/or when aid increases public spending (Morrissey
et al., 2006; Clist and Morrissey, 2011). Some new recent developments suggest that
the impact of aid on tax collection depends on the quality of institutions (Brun et al.,
2011b; Benedek et al., 2012).
The bedrock of any skepticism about aid is whether the recipient government will
conduct the necessary reforms with the utmost determination it would have had if it
could not receive aid, which poses the question of the quality of its will. For now,
everything seems to indicate that this strong political commitment is not utterly yet
conspicuous in several recipient countries. A 2011 report of the G-20 Development
Working Group strongly advocates for greater national political will to foster the e-
ciency of the contribution of foreign aid in promoting ecient tax system. The relevance
of the degree of political will lies in the fact that it determines the quality of the whole
process of the decision-making of policymakers and taxpayers.
Arguably, the degree of political instability, which measures the degree of govern-
ment instability, has an important role in explaining that of political will and support
and the ability of governments to conduct reforms. A number of papers show that
uncertainty about the stability of policymakers generates uncertainty about the sus-
tainability of the current and future courses of economic policies (tax rates, public
goods etc.) (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Alesina et al., 1996; Carmignani, 2003). This
uncertainty about their survival may lead governments to engage in suboptimal policies
by undertaking myopic policies in order to stay in oce, to enlarge their electoral con-
sensus and most importantly by delaying or reversing the required structural reforms,
by reneging their previous commitments etc.(Carmignani, 2003). As a result, these
suboptimal policies induce economic ineciencies. In a context of political instability,
citizens may not trust government commitment to provide good quality of public ser-
vices and to promote growth. They then prefer to create reserves for access to private
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services instead of paying taxes. In that case, foreign aid which one objective is to
contribute to nance public services which in turn should promote tax compliance does
not translate into additional domestic resources.
Political instability then worsens relationships between citizens and the state and
compromises the eciency of foreign aid in promoting tax collection. Another issue
related to political instability is that the change in government direction sometimes
causes an upheaval in the whole of administration including sta in charge of reforms
of tax administrations. This change may be favorable if the current administration
is incompetent and/or corrupt and their substitutes are viewed as an improvement
(Alesina et al., 1996). However this seems to be far from the reality. In instance, Fossat
and Bua (2013) point out that political instability and frequent turnover of ministers
of nance and tax administration managers in SSA francophone countries worsen the
inadequate political support and their insucient commitment, which in turn impair
the implementation of tax reforms.
Since government stability determines the quality of reforms and public services, tax
compliance while aid is expected to be ecient in promoting tax collection in countries
where good reforms are implemented, it is logical to expect that government stability
aects the relationship between aid and tax performances. But this issue in aid-tax
relationship has not been very highlighted to our knowledge.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at assessing the impact of
government stability in aid-tax relationship focusing on West African Economic and
Monetary Union countries in the line with the Fossat and Bua (2013) report. The
choice of WAEMU is interesting as while member countries share a number of com-
mon economic features and scal arrangements, they may dier between them and over
time on government stability. WAEMU has adopted since 1994 convergence criteria
targeting ination, public debt and decits to monitor the scal situation of member
countries. To meet these criteria, a scal transition program has been adopted aim-
ing at increasing tax revenues over 17% of GDP. In addition, administrative reforms
have been undertaken to decentralize the scal administration while audit oces and
computer systems have been established to improve public nancial management. Tax
administrations have also adopted code of ethics and deontology. The reforms aim to
eliminate fraud, evasion, corruption and to increase scal compliance. In spite of these
reforms, the tax to GDP ratio remains below the target. During the former decade,
it reached about 15.6% on average in WAEMU. However, in a context of government
stability improvement, while aid reliance remains very high, it signicantly decreases.
The level of aid-to-tax ratio represents 132% over 1985-1994 against only 84% over
1995-2010 (Benedek et al., 2012; World Bank, 2014). The remaining question for these
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countries is whether they have reached a critical level of stability that shifts a signicant
eect of aid on tax performance.
This last question determines the second objective of the paper. Indeed, the liter-
ature is characterized by some critics related to the treatment of heterogeneity across
countries and over time. Though many eorts have been made to control them through
panel data instead of cross-sections or sub-samples, there remains an important chal-
lenge for model specication (Prichard et al., 2013). In particular, studies testing
the eect of institutions on aid-tax relationship often use an interaction term between
institutions and aid or either use sub-samples of countries grouped by their level of
institutional quality. These approaches potentially suer from several limitations. The
interactive term assumes that externalities generated by institutional quality or aid are
homogeneously varying over time since they result from a bilinear relationship. In ad-
dition, sub-sample approach is often based on an arbitrary cuto between groups and it
doesn't allow countries to move from one group to another. In order to circumvent these
shortcomings, we resort to Panel Smooth Transition Regression(PSTR)to toughly test
for any non-linearity in aid-tax relationship and to determine endogenously the thresh-
old of government stability from which the eects of aid on tax revenues shifts critically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
the eect of aid on tax performances. Section 3 outlines the scal and institutional
challenges as well as the aid reliance in WAEMU. Section 4 describes the methodology
and data. Section 5 discusses the results while section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
The literature on the eects of aid on tax performances can be subdivided into three
major trends: i) aid crowds out tax revenues; ii) aid doesn't lower tax eort and iii)
the eect of aid on tax mobilization is conditional.
Three main ideas are put forward to demonstrate that aid lowers domestic tax col-
lection. These arguments generally rely on the adverse consequences of aid for macroe-
conomic stability (Gupta et al., 2003). Firstly, aid is more volatile and unpredictable
than domestic revenues and this instability increases with the aid dependency. Sec-
ondly, pro-poor public spending becomes highly aid-dependent and then falls when aid
ows diminish or cease. Thirdly, Azam et al. (1999) have theoretically demonstrated
that high dependency on aid is damageable for governance in the long run. In particu-
lar, it doesn't encourage governments to adopt good policies or to develop an eective
public revenue and expenditure system. Moreover, by weakening governance, foreign
aid makes the recipients governments more vulnerable to the inuence of interest groups
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demanding more tax exemptions (Gupta et al., 2003).
Numerous empirical studies have supported evidence of this latter argument. Rem-
mer (2004), through a regression analysis of 120 developing countries over 1970{1999
period nds that aid systematically generates incentives and opportunities for the ex-
pansion of government spending. In contrast, aid reduces revenue collection. Brautigam
and Knack (2004) show that more aid erodes the quality of governance and the tax to
GDP ratio over the 1982-1997 period. Although their results are strong to various
econometric specications (OLS, 2SLS and Ordered Logit), they are based on cross-
section regressions with only about 30 countries. In further cross-section regressions
of 110 developing countries over 1999-2005 and using a World Bank indicator on "e-
ciency of revenue mobilization", Knack (2009) shows that aid exerts a negative eect
on tax systems. The main limit of these studies is that they use cross-section data and
do not deal with time dynamics.
In addition, the evidence of unfavorable impact of aid on tax systems through polit-
ical institutions of the recipient countries is debatable since some studies nd out that
aid promotes governance or doesn't change the trajectory of the institutions (Wright,
2009; Dutta et al., 2013).
In extension of these previous investigations, there are a number of empirical studies
that focus on the conditions under which aid could be eective in improving tax perfor-
mances. The rst idea is that the eect of aid depends on its composition. Empirical
results of Gupta et al. (2003) in a sample of 107 developing countries over 1970-2000
suggest that grants reduces tax eort but that loans, because they must be repaid,
encourage tax collection. Using more recent data and a wider sample of 118 countries
over 1980-2009, Benedek et al. (2012) nd similar results. They also nd that net ODA
and grants are negatively associated with VAT, excise and income taxes but positively
with trade taxes. Besides, they test for nonlinearities by including a squared term for
aid or aid component (grants and loans) as explanatory.
Notwithstanding the echo that these studies have received, other empirical investi-
gations show that the negative relationship between aid and tax eort is not robust and
in some cases is positive. Clist and Morrissey (2011) report a positive eect of grants
on tax to GDP ratio on a sample of 82 developing countries over 1970-2005. The pos-
itive eect of grants occurs even over the medium term. The approach of Brun et al.
(2011a) departs from all of the other studies. Following Stotsky and WoldeMariam
(1997), they rst compute an indicator of tax eort from the residuals of the regression
of government revenue on structural determinants of tax (GDP per capita, the ratios of
import and agriculture value added to GDP, and the share of fuel and mineral exports
in total exports). They then regress tax eort on macroeconomic policy variables (pri-
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mary budget decit, debt service, ination and real exchange rate); aid variables (total
aid level, grants, loans and aid instability) as well as institutional variables (corruption,
quality of bureaucracy and democracy). According to their results, the positive impact
of aid on tax eort does not depend on aid forms; either it is grant or loan.
Furthermore, studies defending a negative correlation between aid and tax revenues
or the primacy of loans versus grants spark also some important econometric concerns.
According to Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Morrissey et al. (2006), the economet-
ric models of Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012) are mis-specied as they
result from the contemporaneous relationship between aid and tax. Then there is no
surprise to have a negative sign of grants insofar as the poorest countries, or countries
experiencing a crisis, tend to have a lower tax to GDP ratio and larger grants. It is
thus necessary to test for lagged eects of aid, especially when changes in tax collection
systems are gradual and usually operate over the medium term. In addition, it seems
hard to accept that technical assistance for institutional strengthening and tax admin-
istration reforms does not improve tax performances. The econometric estimates of
Brun et al. (2011b) evince that the International Monetary Fund programs aect posi-
tively revenue collection in the recipient countries although this eect varies according
to institutional quality.
Besides the whole controversy on aid tax eects, there seems to be a consensus on
the role of the quality of institutions in improving these eects. However, only a few
number of papers examine this issue including those of Gupta et al. (2003), Benedek
et al. (2012), Brun et al. (2011a), Brun et al. (2011b) and Alonso and Garcimartn
(2011). In general, they conrm, with the exception of Alonso and Garcimartn (2011),
the premise that aid does improve tax eort in countries where institutions are good.
In these countries, governments are more accountable vis--vis of their citizens and more
prone to pursuit tax reforms rather than countries with poor institutions. In this
context, aid inows are more likely to be viewed as additional resources for achieving
the country development objectives.
However, this last strand of studies examines the conditional aid-tax revenue nexus
in dierent ways, which are sometimes questionable. Gupta et al. (2003) successively
use two ways. They rst include in the tax revenue equation the institutional variable
(proxied by the ICRG corruption index). This obviously fails to test the interaction
between institutions and aid. Then they construct sub-samples according to corruption
levels. Their results indicate that the negative impact of grants is substantially am-
plied in countries with weak institutions in comparison with the whole sample. But
concessional loans though still having an osetting eect become statistically insignif-
icant in the most corrupt quartile. Benedek et al. (2012) follow the second approach
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of Gupta et al. (2003) and come to similar conclusions, however with a strong negative
impact for both loans and grants in the most corrupt countries.
Brun et al. (2011a) note that the sub-samples approach is limited for three rea-
sons. First, the estimations by sub-samples do not allow testing the signicance of
the dierence between the estimated coecients through the regressions. It is then
hard to conrm a stronger negative eect of grants in countries with weak institutions.
Second, corruption is only a limited explanation. Third, the authors criticize the ad
hoc/arbitrary choice of the threshold levels of the corruption index.
Brun et al. (2011a) then use the interactive term between corruption and aid vari-
ables in the whole sample regression; and alternative institutional variable including
the ICRG bureaucracy and democracy indexes. Only the quality of bureaucracy fuels
a positive impact of aid on tax eort.
Alonso and Garcimartn (2011) and Brun et al. (2011b) follow the same approach.
The formers use an index of income distribution as an institutional variable, but fail to
nd an impact on the aid-tax relationship, even controlling for institutional quality by
ICRG indicators. On the opposite, the latter authors show that IMF programs are less
ecient in Sub-Saharan Africa countries because of institutional ineciency. But for
the whole of sample, institutional quality proxied by the quality of bureaucracy favors
positive impact of aid on tax mobilization. If their results seem to be stronger, the
explanation given to the negative sign of the interaction between IMF programs and
Sub-Saharan countries may be problematic. Indeed, it neglects the fact that institutions
have improved in many of these countries through a long history of institutional and
administrative reforms. The concern of alternative institutional indicators remains as
the ICRG bureaucracy quality and democratic accountability indexes are very inertial
over time.
In short, literature on aid-tax nexus is controversial. The mixed results are due to
samples, specications, methods used to control for the endogeneity of aid, as well as
the quality of data (even if we dont stress on this issue, see Prichard et al. (2013) and
Alonso and Garcimartn (2011) for more details). Beyond the seemingly wide agreement
that quality of institutions plays a major role in explaining aid-tax nexus, research on
this eld is still opened. The discussion above shows that the issue is not as simple as
it seems. The previous studies have used very large samples including countries that do
not necessarily share the same monetary and scal policies. Admittedly, heterogeneity
is sometimes controlled for by working with regional or income level dummies or with
sub-samples. But even within these groups of countries, institutional frameworks may
dier. The section below highlights this fact in the case of the WAEMU countries in
spite they share identical rules for monetary and scal policies. Our task then stresses
9
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that progressive eorts made by recipient governments in terms of their ability to carry
out successfully their reforms may smoothly shift the sign and/or the magnitude of the
impact of aid on tax.
3 Fiscal and institutional challenges and aid reliance in WAEMU
Since the 1980s, the eight WAEMU members have successively engaged in hard macroe-
conomic reforms and the "new" generation reforms. The hard reforms were developed
in the frame of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) over the 1980s to the
middle of 1990s. They aim at stabilizing macroeconomic imbalances and to counteract
the recession under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. They essentially
consist in resizing public services, cutting drastically public interventions in productive
activities, liberalizing trade and stimulating the private sector.
The "new" generation reforms have been implemented through the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) since the mid-1990s. They translate at the national level
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in which the Government declares
its development goals targets and the measures to attain them. These eorts receive
the support of international community through notably the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) completed by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2006
(Bank, 2011). All the member countries of the Union beneted from these debts relief
initiatives. Cote d'Ivoire became the last recipient in 2012 after a decade of military
and political instability.
The core message of the PRSP is to free up additional resources for poverty reduction
and development programs. The program package encompasses institutional and deep
economic reforms. The major reforms in WAEMU have been developed in the frame of
fostering the process of regional integration. In 1994, the Union adopted convergence
criteria targeting ination, public debt and decits. The major concern was then to
prevent macroeconomic instabilities in a context of the CFA-franc devaluation and to
generate sustainable economic growth. By now after the changes in 1999 and 2003, the
Pact disentangles the criteria into key and secondary criteria. The key criteria are those
whose violation leads to the formulation of corrective actions or even sanctions (Bamba,
2004). The secondary criteria are considered as indicative structural benchmarks to
achieve internal and external balance. The failure to meet them however does not
result in corrective measures but only recommendations1.
1The key criteria comprise: i) The Ratio of scal balance to nominal GDP (key criterion) should
be greater than or equal to 0% in 2002. Its non-compliance results in sanctions, except in exceptional
circumstances such dened by Regulation No. 11/99/CM/UEMOA, Article 10; ii) The average annual
rate of ination should not exceed 3%; ii) The ratio of outstanding debt to nominal GDP should not
10
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On the scal eld, a regional harmonization programs in the tax and custom areas
has been developed. VAT and Excises directives were introduced in 1998 with the main
objective to gradually substitute domestic taxes for trade duties. In 2000 a customs
union with a common external tari was established. A Fiscal Transition Program was
adopted in 2006 that extensively retook the goals of the VAT and excise directives. The
aim is to achieve a tax burden of 17 percent of GDP with 10 percent derived from do-
mestic revenues and 7 percent from import taxes (Mansour and Graziosi, 2013; Fossat
and Bua, 2013). The external technical support in particular from the IMF-AFRITAC
was engaged to improve tax administration capacities through strategy design, organi-
zational and procedural reforms, IT as well as human capacity building, to strengthen
transparency and integrity, ght corruption and fraud and increase tax compliance etc.
In addition, in 2004 the nancial support of the WAEMU's central bank, the Central
Bank of West African States (BCEAO), to national budgets was suppressed. In 2007,
the BCEAO gained independence and reinforced its mission of ghting ination.
In short, the convergence Pact aims to ensure greater scal discipline in support of
the common monetary policy in order to create favorable conditions for price stability
and for strong sustainable growth. However, it leads to a certain number of challenges.
First, the suppression of the seigniorage means that the member states are able to
properly exploit a disposable scal space in support to the objective of 7% growth re-
quired to curb substantially poverty in the Union. Unfortunately the Union's economic
growth although being positive has never reached this goal. Between 1994 and 2012,
the per capita growth has been situated at about 1.4% against -1.3% over the period
1980-199(World Bank, 2014). Second, table 1 shows that a number of the eight mem-
bers violate the convergence criteria. Only the criterion of the total debt to GDP ratio
is met by all the members, thanks to HIPC debt reliefs.
Remarkably, the key criteria of scal balance and tax revenue are the most violated
criteria, with the current account balance, despite tax reforms. It results in persistent
public decits and high dependency on aid as table 2 highlights.
Over the period 1987-2010, the scal balance is negative in all members with a few
exceptions but with a general improvement after 1994. The average ratio decreases from
-8% over the period 1987-1993 to -5.2% and -3.3% respectively over the periods 1994-
1999 and 2007-2010. Aid inows dramatically decrease while the tax rate increases
slowly from 12% of GDP to 14.7%. Those slow improvements can be explained to
exceed 70% by the year 2005;iv) current payment arrears should not be generated. There are also four
second criteria: i) The tax burden should reach at least 17% of GDP. ii) The ratio of public wage bill
to tax revenue should not exceed 35%;iii) The share of domestically-funded public investment should
reach at least 20% of tax revenues iv) The ratio of the current account balance excluding grants to
nominal GDP should be greater than or equal to 5%.
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Table 1: WAEMU Number of Countries Violating Convergence Criteria, 2010{2013
2010 2011 2012 2013
First-order criteria
Basic scal balance/GDP ( 0% ) 3 6 5 5
Average consumer price ination ( 3% ) 0 5 3 0
Total debt/GDP ( 70 percent) 0 1 0 0
Change in domestic arrears ( 0) 1 1 5 1
Change in external arrears ( 0) 0 2 1 0
Second-order criteria
Wages and salaries/tax revenue ( 35% ) 4 5 6 5
Capital spending dom. nanced/tax revenue ( 20%) 4 2 1 3
External current acc. balance, excl. grants/GDP (  5%) 6 6 5 7
Tax revenue/GDP ( 17%) 7 7 6 6
Source: IMF 2014
Table 2: Fiscal balances and aid's reliance in WAEMU over the period 1987{2010
Fiscal balance (% GDP) Tax burden (?17%) Ratio of aid ows (% GDP)
Period 87-93 94-99 00-06 07-10 87-93 94-99 00-06 07-10 87-93 94-99 00-06 07-10
Benin -5.8 3.3 1.5 -2.3 9.0 12.1 14.6 17.3 13.1 11.3 9.1 9.8
Burkina Faso -5.2 -3.0 -4.8 -5.5 8.6 11.0 11.2 12.6 13.7 17.0 12.8 12.6
Cote dIvoire -7.2 -3.3 0.6 -1.2 18.0 15.9 15.2 16.2 5.2 8.8 2.8 4.4
Guinea-Bissau -18.2 -16.4 -14.5 -5.8 { 10.2 6.0 9.6 51.7 50.5 18.1 16.5
Mali -8.6 -0.5 -0.4 -3.4 11.3 12.8 14.7 14.2 15.5 18.3 12.9 12
Niger -4.6 -13.2 -2.2 -1.8 7.6 7.0 9.6 12.9 16.2 15.4 14.9 11.4
Senegal -9.2 -1.2 -0.1 -4.4 14 14.2 17.3 18.8 12.1 11.8 9.1 7.7
Togo -5.5 -6.9 -0.11 -2.2 16.6 12.9 13.7 15.6 12.6 9.8 3.7 10.9
WAEMU -8.0 -5.2 -2.5 -3.3 12.2 12.0 12.8 14.7 17.5 17.9 10.42 10.7
Source: Authors from Keen and Mansour (2010), various IMF-article IV reports, World Bank (2014)
some extent by the various reforms undertaken at sub-national level and at the same
time question the conditions of their eciency. Indeed, the situation varies signicantly
among the member states. A closer look at the table 2 reveals that the higher the income
level, the lower is aid dependency and the higher is tax revenue ratio. The apparent
sensitivity of tax revenue to aid inows also varies considerably. Mansour and Graziosi
(2013) argue that the lack of credibility, due to the absence of a clear mechanism of
sanctions in the WAEMU explains the gaps between "de jure and de facto coordination"
characterized by exibility in base setting is induced by various directives, ongoing tax
competition through special tax regimes. Heterogeneities among countries are also
explained by the dierent changes in the GDP composition among members.
Inconsistency depends on the quality of institutions, in particular the ability of
governments to lead successful reforms despite the pressure of interest groups, their
ability to promote a safety environment, and gain popular support. When the risk
of instability is low, a scal contract between government and citizens is more likely,
aiming at decreasing the reliance on foreign assistance. But the scal contract might
also enforce a mutual consensus to not tax for and maintain aid reliance.
The graphs below report the changes in average government stability, foreign aid
12
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and tax ratios in WAEMU over 1985-2010. The 1990s were marked by a low level of
government stability when the SAPs have been implemented. In contrast, the reforms
of 1994-1999, and the development of PSRPs documents involving a large participation
of populations, have beneted from a continuous improvement in government stability.
After the peak in 1999, the index of government stability trendily decreases until 2005
before a slight increase.
Figure 1: Foreign aid, tax ratios and government's stability in WAEMU
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Source: Authors from WDI, Keen and Mansour (2010) database, various IMF-article IV reports and
World Bank (2014) and PRSP(2013)
After 1996 where a marked improvement of government stability is noted, the tax
to GDP ratio moved above the foreign aid ratio2.
In short, the main characteristics of the tax system in WAEMU do not change
signicantly because of a lack of credibility in enforcing the reforms maintaining tax
exemptions, fraud and the presence of heterogeneities despite the support of interna-
tional partners. The purpose of this paper is to test econometrically if there is a cuto
of government stability index beyond which aid inows promote tax collections.
2The peak in foreign aid in 1994 is mainly due to the devaluation of local currency which inates
the domestic currency nominal value of aid.
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4 Methodology and data
In this section, we expose the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) and show
how it contributes to better account for the role of institutional heterogeneity in aid-tax
nexus in WAEMU. We assume that this institutional heterogeneity is related to gov-
ernment stability as the latter determines the probability of occurrence of the necessary
reforms and the quality of their implementation which in turn aect the impact of aid
on tax revenues.
4.1 The Panel Smooth Transition Regression
The PSTR model was recently developed by Gonzalez et al. (2005) and Fok et al.
(2005). This model is a regime-switching model that allows for a small number of ex-
treme regimes. It can be seen as a generalization of the Panel Threshold Regression
(PTR hereafter) model proposed by Hansen (1999) in which coecients of some ex-
planatory variables are function of the value of another variable called the transition
variable. In the PTR model, the modeled regime shift is sharp while in the PSTR
the shift is modeled through a smooth transition function. The estimated coecients
are continuous functions of an observable variable through a bounded function of this
variable (Gonzalez et al., 2005). The PSTR model addresses both heterogeneity and
time variability by allowing coecients to vary smoothly with respect to country and
time.
Our hypothesis is that the eects of aid variables dier according to the level of
government stability which represents our variable of political stability. The govern-
ment stability here is dened as the lower risk for government to not deviate from its
declared programs and to not remove from oce. This gathers three conditions. First,
it involves that there is unity of the executive team and the cabinet around the govern-
ment's general policy goals. Second, the government can strongly lean on the legislative
to implement its program. As a combination of the both conditions, the third condition
states that government has the popular support. Obviously, this assumption is ques-
tionable at certain points. In a context of too fragile institutions, having legislative and
popular supports or keeping on declared projects is not a complete umbrella against
military coups or a guarantee for good reforms. One might simply admit that keeping
decidedly on its program and the respect of the three conditions are enough to provide a
certain umbrella against instability all things being equal. A stable government should
be thus seen as a good reformer able to convince its citizens about the relevance of its
reforms. In a highly risky environment, a weak government is constantly under threat
of being removed from oce. Thus, it is tempted to develop some suboptimal strategies
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to remain in oce. Imagine that one way is to increase public spending. It has two pos-
sibilities of funding: increasing tax or substituting aid for tax. As raising tax is costly
compared to aid, it will deliberately delay the tax reforms. Several authors demonstrate
other implications about the uncertainty of government survival. Alesina and Tabellini
(1990), Edwards and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992) emphasize that kind
of governments renounce to implement good policies in order to worsen the state for
their successors.
Moreover, Murphy et al. (1991) show that an uncertain and weak government is
more prone to plead lobbyist and pressure groups, thus leading to a more direct eect
of rent-seeking activities on policy decisions (Alesina et al., 1996). Another aspect of
government instability concerns the sta in tax administrations. In general, changes
in cabinet also lead to changes or assignments to other positions of tax managers in
charge of tax reforms. The risk to be ousted may make them to be sensitive to rent-
seeking in order to compensate the loss of their associate advantages in one hand. In
other hand, the frequent turnover of tax managers and sta may complicate and make
inecient the discussions between the country and its international partners especially
in terms of consistency and follow-up over time of the required reforms. Because of
these evident economic ineciencies, we assume that aid is more ecient in promoting
tax performances at higher levels of government stability and less ecient at lower
levels.
Hence, assuming that government stability would dene dierent regimes character-
ized by dierent eects from explanatory factor to tax{to{GDP, the basic PSTR model
with two extreme regimes and a single transition function would be dened as:
taxit = i + 
0
0xit + 
0
1xitg(stabit; ; stab) + uit (1)
where _{ = 1; : : : ; n represent countries and t = 1; : : : ; T years. The variable tax is
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, the vector xit includes the ratio of foreign aid to GDP
and the other traditional factors of tax{to{gdp ratio.
0 and 1 are two vectors of parameters to be estimated. i and uit denote the
xed individual eects and the errors, respectively. The errors are assumed to be _{:_{:d.
stabit is the government stability index in country _{ and year t. The transition function
g(stabit; ; stab) is a continuous function of the threshold variable so that the value of
stabit determines the value of g(stabit; ; stab). Thus the eects of x on tax revenue for
country _{ at time t is given by:
@taxit
@xit
= 0 + 1g(stabit; ; stab) (2)
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The transition function value is bounded between 0 and 1 dening the two extreme
regimes: when it equals zero, the eects of x on tax revenue equals 0 and when it
equals one, the eects of x on (the x-elasticity of) tax revenue equals 0 + 1. Granger
and Terasvirta (1993) and Gonzalez et al. (2005) specify g as the following logistic
function:
g(stabit; ; stab) =
241 + exp(  mY
_|=1
(stabit   stab _|))
35 1 (3)
where stab (stab = stab1; : : : ; stabm)
0 is an m-dimensional vector of location (threshold)
parameters and the estimated term  measures the slope of the transition function.
As we briey noted, in comparison with the use of sub-sample and the use of a
simple interaction term, the PSTR provides some advantages. It allows coecients (in
particular aid coecient) to vary between countries and over time. Moreover, in PSTR
model, there are as many values of the (aid) impact coecient(s), lying between 0 and
0 + 1 , as the number of country-year observations. This is why in the following we
interpret only the signs of 0 and 1 rather than their values.
Regarding the value of the slope , when it equals zero the transition function
reduces to a constant and the model is the standard linear model with individual eects,
i.e. constant and homogeneous coecients; if it tends towards innity, the transition
function becomes an indicator function and the PSTR model in (1) reduces to the two-
regime PTR model of Hansen (1999) in the case where m = 1, for instance. When
m  1 and  tends to innity, the number of regimes remains two but the function
switches between zero and one (Colletaz et al., 2006).
The control variables reect the sector composition of the economy, the initial level of
economic development, trade openness, macroeconomic policies as well as the quality
of the institutional environment. Institutional quality improves tax collection (Brun
et al., 2011b; Benedek et al., 2012). Agricultural and industrial values added as a
percentage of GDP are used as proxy of economic structure. It states that a large share
of agriculture in total output and employment, being largely a subsistence activity,
lowers the possibility of a modern tax system based on personal income taxes and value
added taxes (Tanzi and Zee, 2000). On the contrary, industrial sector is easier to tax
(Clist and Morrissey, 2011). The correlation between tax revenues and real GDP per
capita, is expected to be positive as economic development increases both the demand
for public services and tax base.
Trade openness is proxied by the sum of exports and import as a percentage of
GDP. Trade taxes are likely easier to be collected. According to Rodrik (1998) and
Gupta (2007), trade openness calls for a greater role of public sector in providing social
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insurance in more open economies subject to outer risks. But the opposite eect may
come when countries are engaged in trade liberalization viatari reduction (Benedek
et al., 2012). Ination, measured by the percent change in average consumer prices, is
assumed to harm tax revenues since it aects negatively their real value following the
so{called Oliveira-Tanzi eect. In addition, we construct a dummy variable to capture
the major reforms engaged in the WAEMU zone since the devaluation in 1994. It takes 1
in 1994, 1998{2000, 2002 and 2006{2007 and 0 otherwise in line with the above overview
of public and macroeconomic reforms. To allow additional robustness, we include the
level of foreign debt to proxy the need to generate revenue to service the debt, and
population growth to proxy the potential increase in the tax base. It is expected that
the eects of control variables on tax improve at higher level of government stability.
4.2 Estimation and tests of specication
The estimation procedure consists in eliminating the individual eects i by removing
country-specic means and applying nonlinear least squares to the transformed model.
Gonzalez et al. (2005) propose a testing procedure which declines in i) testing the lin-
earity against the PSTR model (or testing homogeneity against the PSTR alternative),
ii) determining the number, r, of transition functions, that means the number of ex-
treme regimes which is equal to r + 1. The test of homogeneity in PSTR model can
be done by testing: H0 :  = 0 or H0 : 1 = 0. However under the null hypothesis,
the tests are non-standard as the PSTR model contains unidentied nuisance param-
eters. This identication problem is circumvented by replacing g(stabit; ; stab) by its
rst-order Taylor expansion around  = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis based
on the auxiliary regression:
taxit = i + 
0
0 xit + 
0
1 xitstabit + :::+ 
0
mxitstab
m
it + u
m
it (4)
Hence testing the linearity of aid-tax model against PSTR is equivalent to testing
Ho : 

1 = ::: = 

m = 0 in equation(4). SSR0 being the panel sum of squared residuals
under H0, and SSR1, the panel sum of squared residuals with regimes, the correspond-
ing F-statistic is then dened by: LMF = (SSR0 SSR1)=mk
SSR0=(TN N mk)  F (mk; TN  N  m(k+
1)); where k is the number of explanatory variables in the aid-tax function, T is the
number of years and N the number of countries. The test of homogeneity is also a tool
for determining sequentially the number of transitions in the model. Given a PSTR
model, we test the null hypothesis that the model is linear at a predetermined signi-
cance level . If it is rejected, a two-regime PSTR model is estimated. If the two-regime
at turn is rejected a three-regime is estimated. The testing procedure continues until
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the rst acceptance of the null hypothesis of no remaining heterogeneity. At each step
of the sequential procedure, the signicance level must be reduced by a constant factor
0    1 in order to avoid excessively large models.
Let's us conclude this section by addressing the issue of a potential endogeneity
bias. It is common to account for this issue by employing various instrumental technical
tools and instruments even if the results are sensitive to the instruments sets (Clist and
Morrissey, 2011). As such methods are not yet developed in a PSTR context, we simply
lag the aid variable although some authors argue that non-linear models may mitigate
endogeneity issues (Jude and Levieuge, 2013). Gonzalez et al. (2005) used a similar
approach.
4.3 Data
We use a panel dataset that covers six out of the eight countries of the WAEMU over the
period 1986{2010 due to data availability (Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,
Senegal and Togo excluding Benin and Guinea-Bissau). ICRG data on institutional
quality are not available for Benin. The main reason of removing Guinea-Bissau is due
to data accuracy and missing. Besides the data on quality of institutions, ination and
tax revenues, all other data are drawn from the World Development Indicators of the
World Bank.
Tax revenue is the ratio of total tax excluding social contributions to GDP. Database
on this variable is from the Tax Policy Division of Fiscal Aairs Department of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund kindly provided by Keen and Mansour (2010) and Benedek
et al. (2012). It is an extended and improved version of the dataset used in the paper of
Keen and Mansour (2010). Foreign aid is measured as the total net ocial development
assistance as percent of GDP like in most of the related empirical studies. Even though
we focus mainly on this variable, we also decompose this variable into non-technical,
technical grants and concessional loans to test robustness.
Institutional quality is measured through the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) database. It provides information on various risk indicators grouped into three
major categories of risk: political, nancial and economic risks. It is compiled by Polit-
ical Risk Services (PRSP) Group. The ICRG indicators are broadly used in empirical
studies to measure political risk and institutional quality. However, in contrast with
studies which focus on a specic variable, we consider here the overall situation. The
latter is a composite index which is the sum of all twelve major components of the
political risk category ranging from 0 to 100 points. This index comprises: government
stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment prole, internal conict and external
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conict rated from 0 to 12 whilst corruption, military in politics, religious tensions, law
and order, ethnic tensions and democratic accountability rated from 0 to 6 as well as
bureaucracy quality rated from 0 to 4. The higher value of the component, the lower is
the associate risk perceived. This variable is one period lagged to avoid potential en-
dogeneity bias. Data on ination are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook
Database.
Since the individual dimension of our panel is smaller than the time dimension, we
check for stationarity issue. we apply Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS)and Fisher tests as our
panel is not utterly balanced and because we assume that the panel is heterogeneous.
The tests reveal that the alternative hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected for
all the variables. The table of the main descriptive statistics in appendix exhibits
disparities in the level of the variables across countries and time3 in particular in terms
of the stability of government, tax and aid variables. In addition, table 6 in appendix
displays pairwise correlations between tax revenues, ODA and institutional quality for
all the countries in the sample. It shows that total aid and its components are negatively
associated with tax revenues, while institutional quality and government stability are
positively correlated with tax.
5 Results
For comparison purposes, we begin by panel regressions including a simple interac-
tive term between government stability and aid indicator following Brun et al. (2011a)
among others. We use the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with common
AR(1) and panel AR(1) as well as AREG(1)4 to correct the problem of heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. Table 8 in appendices reports all the corresponding results.
When we consider the overall level of aid, the results indicate that aid exerts a negative
eect on tax revenue but this eect is not statistically signicant in all specications.
In contrast, the coecient of the interactive term between aid and political stability is
positive and statistically signicant at 5% only in FGLS common AR(1) specications.
Insert table 8: Interaction Government stability-aid and tax revenue, panel speci-
cations.
Regarding the control variables, our results are globally similar to those reported in
the literature. Real GDP per capita, trade openness and ination have the expected
3More details on within and between statistics could be provided upon request
4AREG has been used because some data missing for foreign debt stock as percent of GDP.
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signs. The eect of real GDP and trade openness is positively and statistically signif-
icant whilst the eect of ination is negative Ghura (1998). The eects of the quality
of institutions, sector composition, reforms, foreign debt and of population growth are
not statistically signicant.
The model of aid composition shows that technical grants hinders tax revenues
in the three specications while the eect of non-technical grants is not statistically
signicant. Loans have a marginally positive eect. The interactive terms with the
political stability variable present more mixed results, positive and signicant with
technical grants in one regression, negative with loans in one regression too.
Hence, through the linear interaction eect, we cannot thoroughly establish that
government stability improves aid-tax relationship in the sample. Moreover, the sign
and signicance of some control variables are questionable. For example, its debat-
able that quality of institutions and reforms do not improve collection as they increase.
Likewise, the positive sign of trade openness may hide the eects of trade liberaliza-
tion with the associate decline in taris. These doubts indicate that the simple panel
with interaction terms is not a strong approach to test heterogeneities in aid-tax im-
pact upon government stability level. Moreover we must also relax the hypothesis of
homogeneous coecients for the control variables in order to account fully for all the
historical process of the reforms in the union.
Panel Threshold eect models
The rst stage in PSTR application is to test the linearity hypothesis. The table 3
below reports the linearity test results of all the specications. In order to check the
robustness of the existence of the threshold eects, we provide ve regressions with the
lagged overall level of foreign aid as the variable of interest. The rst regression model
focuses on the main determinants proposed by the literature. The second regression in-
cludes one period lagged foreign debt stock and the third regression population growth.
The fourth regression deals with the issue of trade liberalization. Indeed, Clist and
Morrissey (2011) argue that the distinction between imports and exports matters and
nd that both have opposite sign. The last regression carries only the major signicant
variables in the majority of the regressions in exception with the debt outstanding as we
will see later that adding debt variable involves an increase in the estimated threshold
level.
The three linearity tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of linearity of the rela-
tionship between aid and tax conditionally to the level of government stability in the
ve regressions. However, the tests of no-remaining non-linearity cannot reject the null
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Table 3: Tests of linearity and of no remaining non-linearity
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Tests Linearity r=1 vs
r=2
Linearity r=1 vs
r=2
Linearity r=1 vs
r=2
Linearity r=1 vs
r=2
Linearity r=1 vs
r=2
Wald 31.992 13.898 41.584 14.690 42.869 14.581 45.352 11.524 40.244 7.912
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.084) (0.000) ( 0.100) (0.000) (0.148) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.245)
Fischer 4.609 1.532 5.764 1.410 5.372 1.226 5.251 0.838 8.449 1.168
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.153) (0.000) (0.192) (0.000) (0.282) (0.000) (0.602) (0.000) (0.328)
LR 35.983 14.584 48.758 15.466 50.551 15.345 54.079 11.994 46.911 8.130
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.079) (0.000) (0.120) (0.000) (0.364) (0.000) (0.229)
r=1 vs r=2: No remaining non-linearity with one threshold versus with at least two thresholds.LR is Likelihood Ratio
hypothesis of one regime against the alternative of at least two extreme regimes in all
the cases. Then, the results suggest that transition is suitably featured by two regimes.
Insert table 9: Government stability and aid-tax relationship, PSTR results.
Table 9 presents the estimated parameters for the ve specications. The location
parameters are stable through the regressions and close to the half of the maximum
value of the threshold variable, between 5.5 and 5.9. This result means the countries
in the sample do not need to highly perform in government stability to signicantly
shift the eects of foreign aid on tax revenues. This required relative low level can be
explained by the prominent weakness of government stability index.
The graphs of the aid-coecients of tax ratio against the government stability index
are plotted in gure 2 in appendix for each regression. They show that increase in the
threshold variable is smoothly associated with a positive link between aid and tax
revenues from the inferior to the superior regimes. This result is strongly consistent
across the specications. In lower regimes, aid harms tax performances. In contrast,
in upper regimes of the level of government stability, aid coecient is positive and
statistically signicant. Our results go thus in line with the general premise that the
quality of institutions matters for the eect of aid on tax. They are similar to the results
of Gupta et al. (2003), Brun et al. (2011a), Brun et al. (2011b) and Benedek et al. (2012)
even using dierent institutional quality indicators. A further analysis shows that the
government stability is situated beyond this threshold in all the countries since the rst
years of MDG implementation suggesting that the joint eorts of national authorities
and international community in combating the extreme poverty have been translated
into more tax revenues. We carefully avoid interpreting the degree of the change in
the estimated coecients because between the two regimes there is a continuum of
coecients and at this stage only the interpretation of the signs of the parameters is
plausible. We will go back to the computed estimates for each country and each year
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in a later section.
For the variables of control, the PSTR results are more economically reasonable
than those of the linear interactions. Indeed, the coecient of institutional quality and
the reforms become statistically signicant in contrast with linear interaction regres-
sions. Interestingly, they are negative in the lower regimes and positive in the upper
regimes. At high levels of government stability, the institutional quality and the reform
implementation promote tax eciency while they impede tax eciency at low levels.
These results support the ndings of Bird et al. (2008) indicating that better institu-
tions (voice, accountability and control of corruption) improve tax eciency. Therefore,
countries must pursuit their eorts to keep the regional criteria and the frame of mul-
tilateral surveillance in spite the diculties they experience to meet them for a certain
level of stability.
The role of sector composition presents mixed results. Agriculture sector tends to
have no eect whatever the regime we consider while the negative eect of industry in
low regime tends to be canceled in upper regime. If the major argument to the null
eect of agriculture is the diculty to tax this sector, the nuanced results of industrial
sector is due to its low size on which the corporate tax is concentrated. The eect of
trade openness is positive in the low regime but negative in the upper regime. The
distinction of export and import shows that this eect is drawn from imports eect.
The eect of exports is not statistically signicant. This situation results from the
liberalization program in the frame of regional integration.
However, the real per capita income presents an unexpected eect. At high levels
of government stability, it hinders signicantly tax revenues while it stimulates them at
low levels. This ambiguous sign is however usual in the literature (Clist and Morrissey,
2011). A plausible explanation is that the positive changes in reforms are too recent so
that they haven't yet impulsed a very strong and high economic growth that improves
substantially welfare and then contributes to high quality levels of services demanding
more tax revenues. Population growth and ination are not statistically signicant in
both regimes. The coecient of foreign debt stock seems to be negative in the superior
regime of government stability and non signicant in the inferior one but this eect
is not strong across the regressions, resulting from the various rearrangements of debt
stock notably in the frame of HIPC initiative.
Does aid composition matter if government stability reaches some cuto (s)?
The last regressions we conduct are related to aid composition. We wonder if the
eects of dierent forms of aid on tax revenues vary according to government stability.
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Our results demonstrate that the hypothesis of linearity is rejected. However, the tests
of no remaining non linearity exhibit three regimes with two cutos as the table below
reports.
Table 4: Tests of specication with distinctions of aid forms
Tests Linearity r=1 versus r=2 r=2 versus r=3
Wald 56.974 47.190 32.833
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.0.003) (0.108)
Fischer 3.070 1.835 0.977
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.021) (0.503)
LR 71.800 56.744 37.089
(pvalue) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043)
Source: Authors' calculations
The slope parameters estimated reveal that the transition function is smooth in in-
termediary regime from regime 0 to regime 1 and then abrupt from regime 1 to regime
2. Table 10 in appendices reports detailed results.
Insert table 10: Government stability, aid composition and tax collection, PSTR
results.
The table provides more statistically nuanced results in comparison with those found
in the case of the overall level of aid. Technical and non-technical grants are statisti-
cally signicant only in the third regime. In the latter, while the non-technical grants
negatively aect countries tax performances at 5%, technical grants are positively asso-
ciated with an increase in tax eciency at 1%. For the eect of loans, it is characterized
by a U-inverted trajectory from the regime 0 to regime 2. These results suggest that
none form of aid is ecient when the quality of government stability is very low and
that only loans should be provided in a context of democratic transition. On the other
side, loans and non-technical grants are harmful to countries tax performances while
only technical aid is benecial when the stability of government shifts sharply.
The eects of the control variables behave in three senses. The rst group of vari-
ables composed of institutional quality, population growth and ination statistically af-
fects negatively the tax revenues in the low regime and positively in the upper regimes.
The second group of variables composed of agriculture, industry, reforms and foreign
debt presents a U-inverted eect across the regimes against a U{eect for real per capita
GDP and trade openness.
Obviously, it is a challenge to give a clear interpretation of these last patterns of
eects. This is one limitation to admit several regimes function. To circumvent this
kind of interpretation diculty, Colletaz et al. (2006) suggest restricting the number
23
Etudes et Documents n° 06, CERDI, 2015
of transitions to one or two. Whatever the diculty to interpret some estimates our
results evidence that the use of panel data to control the individual eects, in consid-
ering common parameters, is not robust.
Estimated individual coecients of foreign aid
The main advantage of using PSTR is to obtain coecients for each country-year.
It allows us to show the gradual sensitivity of tax revenues with respect to aid when
government stability deviates from its threshold. Because of the relative stability of the
parameters across regressions, we analyze the case with the most signicant explana-
tory variables (model 5 of table 6 in appendice). The limited number of countries in the
sample allows us to exhibit the coecient of aid for each country per year. The table 11
exhibits two main areas. The rst one covers the period 1986{1995 and records bad per-
formances. With the exception of Senegal which records only two negative coecients
of aid in 1993 and 1994, those of the ve other countries are negative except for Cote
d'Ivoire in 1992. After 1996 coecients become positive for all countries and close to
0.087. These enhancements result probably from the joint eorts of the international
community and countries through the establishment of PRSPs which involve a wide
participation of populations and dene clear social targets. They contribute to improve
the orientation of aid, the condence in governments in terms of services delivery and
the promotion of a good environment for growth which in turn enhance tax collection.
In general, aid has been eective in generating tax revenues. However, its eects
are very low. In average, when the government stability increases, an increase of 1
point of aid to GDP ratio is associated with an increase of 0.015 point of tax to GDP
ratio. Concerning the individual performances, the average estimated coecient of aid
ranges from -0.10% in Togo to 6.65% in Senegal. Except for Togo, the negative eects
of aid in the rst period have been oset by the positive eects of the second period.
The average coecient of aid 0.90% for Burkina Faso, 0.75% for Mali, 0.69% for Cote
d'Ivoire and 0.05% for Niger.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims at assessing the threshold eects of foreign aid in tax collection condi-
tionally to government stability for six West African Monetary Union Countries, since
several studies show that government stability determines the quality of the developed
reforms. Our results suggest that the relationship between foreign aid and tax revenues
is nonlinear and depends on government stability. Beyond a critical level of government
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stability, aid tends to have a positive impact on tax revenues. In addition, they indicate
that heterogeneity across countries and time matters even if the countries share iden-
tical policies. This nding is strong to various specications including dierent control
variables. We thus propose an estimation of the coecients of aid on tax performances
for each country at each year.
These results have strong policy implications for these countries and also for the
economic literature on aid-tax relationship. First, they suggest that improving the
stability of government and the quality of institutions in general matters to support the
eectiveness of aid and the supply of public services. The results also highlight that it
would be misleading to not deeply and thoroughly account for heterogeneities among
countries and to suppose coecient homogeneity even within sub-samples. Finally, the
nuanced results when account for aid composition urges for further researches on this
issue.
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A Appendices
Table 5: Descriptive data
Variable Obs Mean Standard Deviation. Minimum Maximum
Tax 150 13.157 3.571 5.4 25.7
Gov stability 150 7.337 2.268 2.333 11
Aid 150 11.860 5.593 0.557 28.823
Non-tech grants 150 7.428 6.163 0.214 47.222
Tech grants 150 2.780 1.506 0.257 7.5
loans 150 2.872 2.000 -4.309 9.461
Institutional quality 150 54.109 7.769 36 66.833
Agriculture 150 33.200 9.140 13.383 52.845
Industry 150 20.705 3.050 14.179 27.549
Real GDP per capita 150 6.141 0.469 5.454 7.094
Exports 150 25.609 11.207 8.710 52.651
Trade 150 59.998 18.610 28.374 102.485
Imports 150 34.550 9.510 17.837 59.116
Ination 150 3.219 6.746 -14.936 35.534
Foreign debt stock 149 84.074 42.043 18.201 230.723
population growth 150 3.026 0.739 0.932 9.882
Table 6: Pairwise correlations between tax revenues, ODA and institutions
Tax Gov sta-
bility
Inst.
quality
Aid Non-
tech
grants
Tech
grants
Loans
Tax 1.000
Gov stability 0.229* 1.000
Inst. quality 0.302* 0.481* 1.000
Aid -0.497* -0.315* -0.245* 1.000
Non-tech grants -0.160* 0.033 -0.012 0.488* 1.000
Tech grants -0.555* -0.353* -0.339* 0.754* 0.298* 1.000
Loans -0.275* -0.283* -0.191* 0.690* 0.167* 0.536* 1.000
Notes:*,**,***signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%.
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Table 7: Panel Unit root tests
Variables IPS FISHER
Tax -2.304*** 28.140***
Aid -2.434*** 35.775***
Non-tech grants -4.696*** 39.437***
Tech grants -2.297** -1.843**
Loans -4.441*** 44.883***
Gov stability -1.985*** 28.760***
Institutional quality -1.312* 30.191***
Agriculture -2.097** 33.655***
Industry -2.627*** 28.751**
Real per capita GDP (log) -2.402*** 38.445***
Trade openness -2.711*** 28.145***
Exports -2.396** 30.571***
Imports -3.560*** 24.628**
Foreign debt stock -1.460* 23.184**
Population growth -6.157*** 44.270***
Notes:*,**,***signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Robust Standards errors in(.).
t-bar are reported for IPS assuming that N and time are nite. Fisher tests
correspond to ADF tests.The reported statistics are those of the inverse chi-
squared but for Non-tech grants which statistic is the inverse normal statistic.
30
Etudes et Documents n° 06, CERDI, 2015
Table 8: Interaction Government stability-aid and tax revenue, panel specications
Model 1 2 Aid composition
FGLS
COM-
MON
AR(1)
FGLS
PANEL
AR1
FGLS
COM-
MON
AR(1)
FGLS
PANEL
AR1
AREG
(1) FE
FGLS
COM-
MON
AR(1)
FGLS
PANEL
AR1
AREG(1)
aid -0.044 -0.009 -0.044 -0.011 -0.053
(0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.061)
Non-tech grants 0.010 0.035 0.025
(0.094) (0.088) (0.110)
Tech grants -0.532* -0.510* -0.672**
(0.281) (0.271) (0.305)
Loans 0.334* 0.279 0.233
(0.185) (0 .170) (0.183)
aid*Gov stability 0.014** 0.009 0.013** 0.009 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Non-tech grants*Gov stability 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0 .012) (0 .011) (0.014)
Tech grants*Gov stability 0.058 0.043 0.047**
(0.039) (0.037) (0.048)
Loans*Gov stability -0.042* -0.034 -0.029
(0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
Institutional quality -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.030 0.015 0.011 -0.029
(0.027) (0.024) (0 .027) (0.024) (0.035) (0.028) (0.026) (0.035)
Agriculture 0.0049 -0.0178 0.007 -0.017 -0.067 -0.001 -0.017 -0.062
(0.026) (0.025) (0 .026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.027) (0.025) (0.042)
Industry 0.0475 0.040 0.051 0.043 0.017 0.007 0.006 -0.010
(0.056) (0.053) (0.056) (0 .054) (0.066) (0.059) (0.055) (0.065)
Real per capita GDP (log) 4.571*** 4.628*** 4.621*** 4.595*** 6.020** 4.177*** 4.624*** 5.713**
(0.643) (0.765) (0.641) (0.759) (1.960) (0.668) (0.729) (1.947)
Trade openness 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.035* 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.037**
(0 .013) (0.012) (0.013) (0 .012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018)
Ination -0.029** -0.04*** -0.030** -0.04*** -0.023* -0.021 -0.026* -0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Reforms -0.112 -0.076 -0.113 -0.075 -0.120* -0.166 -0.162 -0.085
(0.193) (0.170) (0.191) (0.168) (0.197) (0.212) ( 0.207) (0.198)
Foreign debt stock 0.003 0.007
(0.008) (0.008)
Population growth -0.116 -0.102 -0.194 -0.125 -0.153 -0.173
( 0.121) (0.101) (0.111) ( 0.140) (0 .106) (0.110)
Adjusted r-squared 0.658 0.6707
F-statistic/Wald chi-square 353.06 231.88 356.85 225.54 2.59 373.36 284.85 2.47
P- Number of observations 150 150 150 150 149 150 150 143
*,**,***signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%. Robust Standards errors in (.)
Notes:Gov: Government, Tech:technical, Non-tech:Non-technical
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Figure 2: Aid-tax coecients conditional on government stability index-model 1 to
model 5 PSTR
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Table 10: Government stability, aid composition and tax collection, PSTR results
Location parameters: stab Regime 0 Regime 1: [4.328; 4.328] Regime 2: [ 4.829; 6.830]
Slope parameters  2.748 140.848
Non-technical grants 0.308 0.014 -0.297**
(0.368 ) (0.423) (0.115)
Technical grants -0.146 -1.090 1.380***
(1.330 ) (1.592) (0.365)
Loans -0.939* 1.513*** -0.625***
(0.501) (0.528) (0.165)
Institutional quality -0.612*** 0.706*** 0.025
( 0.156 ) (0.185) (0.049)
Agriculture -0.522*** 0.672*** -0.145***
(0.188 ) (0.196) (0.043)
Industry -2.596*** 3.619*** -1.064***
(0.362) (0.398) (0.124)
Real GDP per capita 20.411*** -21.215*** 4.163***
(2.545) (2.581) (0.756)
Trade openness 0.648*** -0.610*** 0.060*
(0.110) ( 0.130) (0.031)
Ination -0.333*** 0.119 0.206***
(0.128 ) (0.140) (0.051)
Reforms -2.995 6.350** -3.519***
(3.090 ) (3.157) (1.188)
Foreign debt stock -0.097*** 0.135*** -0.067***
(0.028 ) (0.031) (0.011)
Population growth -3.652*** 3.182*** 0.533**
(1.036 ) (1.015) (0.254)
Notes: *signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. Standard errors in (.)
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Table 11: Individual coecients estimates
Years Cote d'Ivoire Burkina Faso Mali Niger Senegal Togo
1986 -0.138 -0.130 -0.138 -0.130 0.087 -0.130
1987 -0.138 -0.123 -0.138 -0.130 0.087 -0.130
1988 -0.138 -0.103 -0.137 -0.123 0.085 -0.130
1989 -0.082 -0.130 -0.130 -0.082 0.059 -0.127
1990 -0.132 -0.138 -0.134 0.078 -0.002
1991 -0.002 -0.138 -0.137 -0.138 0.084 -0.136
1992 0.040 -0.134 -0.068 -0.139 0.084 -0.138
1993 -0.036 -0.111 -0.002 -0.139 -0.111 -0.139
1994 -0.138 -0.002 -0.130 -0.138 -0.130 -0.138
1995 -0.138 -0.002 -0.130 -0.136 0.050 -0.130
1996 -0.118 0.013 -0.036 0.082 0.065 -0.053
1997 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.088
1998 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
1999 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
2000 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
2001 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088
2002 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088
2003 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087
2004 0.080 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088
2005 0.078 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.087
2006 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.088
2007 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088
2008 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088
2009 0.087 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.088 0.088
2010 0.073 0.087 0.088 0.084 0.088 0.088
Mean (%) 0.686 0.902 0.745 0.054 6.652 -0.104
Source: Authors' estimations
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